King Drug Co of Florence Inc v. Smithkline Beecham Corporation by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-26-2015 
King Drug Co of Florence Inc v. Smithkline Beecham Corporation 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"King Drug Co of Florence Inc v. Smithkline Beecham Corporation" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 668. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/668 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
     PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1243 
___________ 
 
KING DRUG COMPANY OF FLORENCE, INC.; 
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                                                          Appellants 
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SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORPORATION, doing 
business as GLAXOSMITHKLINE; TEVA 
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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-00995 
District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls 
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Before:  AMBRO, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
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_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a rule-of-reason claim under Sections 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), we are asked to determine whether FTC v. Actavis, 
133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013), covers, in addition to reverse cash 
payments, a settlement in which the patentee drug 
manufacturer agrees to relinquish its right to produce an 
“authorized generic” of the drug (“no-AG agreement”) to 
compete with a first-filing generic’s drug during the generic’s 
statutorily guaranteed 180 days of market exclusivity under 
the Hatch-Waxman Act1 as against the rest of the world.  
 
In Actavis, the Supreme Court held that unexplained 
large payments from the holder of a patent on a drug to an 
alleged infringer to settle litigation of the validity or 
infringement of the patent (“reverse payment”) “can 
                                              
1 Hatch-Waxman is the short name for the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.  
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sometimes violate the antitrust laws.” Id. at 2227. The Court 
rejected the near-irrebuttable presumption, known as the 
“scope of the patent” test, that a patentee can make such 
reverse payments so long as it is paying potential competitors 
not to challenge its patent within the patent’s lifetime.  
Plaintiffs here, direct purchasers of the brand-name 
drug Lamictal, sued Lamictal’s producer, Smithkline 
Beecham Corporation, d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”), and 
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. (“Teva”2), a 
manufacturer of generic Lamictal, for violation of Sections 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2.3 In earlier 
                                              
2 “Teva” refers collectively to Teva Pharmaceutical 
Industries Ltd. and its subsidiary Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, 
Inc.  
3 Plaintiffs bring their Sherman Act claims under Sections 
4 (damages) and 16 (injunctive relief) of the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 15 & 26, respectively. The Clayton Act requires “a 
plaintiff to have standing to bring an antitrust claim.” 
Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 273 (3d 
Cir. 1999). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, “a plaintiff must 
allege more than that it has suffered an injury causally linked 
to a violation of the antitrust laws.” Pace Elecs., Inc. v. 
Canon Computer Sys., Inc., 213 F.3d 118, 120 (3d Cir. 2000). 
The plaintiff must also “allege antitrust injury, ‘which is to 
say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to 
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ 
acts unlawful.’” Id. (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). As noted 
below, we do not here address the issue of antitrust injury, nor 
do we preclude consideration of the issue on remand. See 
infra notes 20 & 35 and accompanying text.  
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litigation, Teva had challenged the validity and enforceability 
of GSK’s patents on lamotrigine, Lamictal’s active 
ingredient. Teva was also first to file an application with the 
FDA alleging patent invalidity or nonenforceability and 
seeking approval to produce generic lamotrigine tablets and 
chewable tablets for markets alleged to be annually worth $2 
billion and $50 million, respectively. If the patent suit 
resulted in a judicial determination of invalidity or 
nonenforceability—or a settlement incorporating such 
terms—Teva would be statutorily entitled to a valuable 180-
day period of market exclusivity, during which time only it 
and GSK could produce generic lamotrigine tablets. (The 
relevant statute permits the brand to produce an “authorized 
generic” during the exclusivity period. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. 
FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2006); Teva Pharm. 
Indus. Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see 
also Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc., 659 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011).)  
 
After the judge presiding over the patent litigation 
ruled the patent’s main claim invalid, GSK and Teva settled. 
They agreed Teva would end its challenge to GSK’s patent in 
exchange for early entry into the $50 million annual 
lamotrigine chewables market and GSK’s commitment not to 
produce its own, “authorized generic” version of Lamictal 
tablets for the market alleged to be worth $2 billion annually. 
Plaintiffs contend that this “no-AG agreement” qualifies as a 
“reverse payment” under Actavis because, like the cash 
reverse payments the Court there warned could face antitrust 
scrutiny, GSK’s no-AG commitment was designed to induce 
Teva to abandon the patent fight and thereby agree to 
eliminate the risk of competition in the $2 billion lamotrigine 
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tablet market for longer than the patent’s strength would 
otherwise permit.  
 
We believe this no-AG agreement falls under Actavis’s 
rule because it may represent an unusual, unexplained reverse 
transfer of considerable value from the patentee to the alleged 
infringer and may therefore give rise to the inference that it is 
a payment to eliminate the risk of competition. As the Court 
noted, these kinds of settlements are subject to the rule of 
reason.  
 
I. 
“A patent . . . is an exception to the general rule 
against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and 
open market.” Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & 
Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) (quoting Precision 
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 
816 (1945)). The Constitution’s “Patent Clause itself reflects 
a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the 
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without 
any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.’” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 
489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I., § 8, cl. 
8). In turn, “[f]rom their inception, the federal patent laws 
have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote 
innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement 
through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and 
the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.” Id.; see X 
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 
¶ 1780a (3d ed. 2011) (“Patent law . . . serves the interests of 
consumers by protecting invention against prompt imitation 
in order to encourage more innovation than would otherwise 
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occur.”). A patent, consequently, “is a special privilege 
designed to serve the public purpose of promoting the 
‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” Precision Instrument 
Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 816.  
 
With the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress 
attempted to balance the goal of “mak[ing] available more 
low cost generic drugs,” H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14-15 
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48, with 
the value of patent monopolies in incentivizing beneficial 
pharmaceutical advancement, see H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 
2, at 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2714. 
The Act seeks to accomplish this purpose, in part, by 
encouraging “manufacturers of generic drugs . . . to challenge 
weak or invalid patents on brand name drugs so consumers 
can enjoy lower drug prices.” S. Rep. No. 107-167, at 4 
(2002). The resulting regulatory framework has the following 
four relevant features identified by the Supreme Court in 
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227-29. 
 
First, a new drug—that is, a pioneer, “brand-name” 
drug—cannot be introduced until it is approved by the Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”). 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). A 
New Drug Application (“NDA”) requires the applicant to 
submit, among other things, “full reports of investigations 
which have been made to show whether or not such drug is 
safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use,” id. 
§ 355(b)(1)(A), as well as comprehensive information about 
the drug, id. § 355(b)(1). This reporting requirement entails 
“a long, comprehensive, and costly testing process.” Actavis, 
133 S. Ct. at 2228. 
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Second, the Hatch-Waxman Act facilitates the 
development of generic drugs by allowing an applicant to file, 
for new drugs shown to be “bioequivalent” to a drug 
previously approved by the FDA, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(iv), a less onerous and less costly 
“Abbreviated New Drug Application” (“ANDA”) in lieu of 
an NDA. See id. § 355(j); Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228. The 
ANDA process “allow[s] the generic to piggy-back on the 
pioneer’s approval efforts . . . , thereby furthering drug 
competition.” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228 (citing Caraco 
Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 
1676 (2012)).4  
 
Third, Hatch-Waxman “sets forth special procedures 
for identifying, and resolving, related patent disputes.” Id. A 
new drug applicant must list information on any patents 
issued on the drug’s composition or methods of use. See 21 
U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676. If the FDA 
approves the new drug, it publishes this information, without 
                                              
4 “Rather than providing independent evidence of safety 
and efficacy, the typical ANDA shows that the generic drug 
has the same active ingredients as, and is biologically 
equivalent to, the brand-name drug.” Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 
1676; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (ANDA requirements). Before 
Hatch-Waxman, a company desiring to produce a generic 
version of a drug approved after 1962 had to conduct its own 
testing and trials to show that its generic version was safe and 
effective for human use. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16-
17.  
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verification, in its Orange Book.5 Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676. 
In turn, any manufacturer filing an ANDA to produce a 
generic version of that pioneer drug must consult the Orange 
Book and “assure the FDA that [the] proposed generic drug 
will not infringe the brand’s patents.” Id.6 As relevant here, 
the manufacturer may tender that assurance with a “paragraph 
IV” certification that the relevant listed patents are “invalid or 
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the 
[generic] drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). But 
“[f]iling a paragraph IV certification means provoking 
litigation,” Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677, because the patent 
statute treats paragraph IV certification as a per se act of 
infringement, see 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).7 The patentee 
                                              
5 The volume, officially known as Approved Drug 
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, is 
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/. See generally, e.g., 
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (“Upon approval of the application, the 
Secretary shall publish information submitted . . . .”); Caraco, 
132 S. Ct. at 1676. 
6 Although the FDA performs no independent patent 
review, it cannot approve an ANDA if the proposed generic 
would infringe any of the brand’s asserted patents. See 
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676. 
7 Further, an ANDA applicant making a paragraph IV 
certification must notify any patent holder within twenty days 
of the FDA’s confirmation of its ANDA filing, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(2)(B)(ii), (iii), “of the factual and legal basis of [its] 
opinion . . . that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed,” 
id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II). See also 21 C.F.R. § 314.52 
(“Notice of certification of invalidity or noninfringement of a 
patent”).  
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then has an incentive to sue within 45 days in order to trigger 
a 30-month stay of the FDA’s potential approval of the 
generic “while the parties litigate patent validity (or 
infringement) in court. If the courts decide the matter within 
that period, the FDA follows that determination; if they do 
not, the FDA may go forward and give approval to market the 
generic product.” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228 (citing 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)).8 
“Fourth, Hatch-Waxman provides a special incentive 
for a generic to be the first to file an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application taking the paragraph IV route.” Id. at 2228-29. 
From when it first begins marketing its drug or when a court 
enters judgment finding the challenged patent invalid or 
unenforceable, the first-filing generic enjoys a 180-day period 
of exclusivity during which no other generic manufacturer 
can enter the market. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), (iv).9 
                                              
8 Hatch-Waxman “allows competitors, prior to the 
expiration of a patent, to engage in otherwise infringing 
activities necessary to obtain regulatory approval.” Eli Lilly & 
Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 671 (1990); see 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). As long as a generic applicant does not 
launch its generic “at risk” (i.e., after FDA approval after 30 
months but before a determination of patent validity), it will 
not be forced to pay money damages. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(4)(C). This feature also explains “the creation of a 
highly artificial act of infringement”—the paragraph IV 
certification—to permit the brand and generic to litigate 
patent validity. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 678. 
9 Under current law, the specific mechanism is that an 
application by a non–first filer “shall be made effective on the 
date that is 180 days after the date of the first commercial 
marketing of the drug . . . by any first applicant.” 21 U.S.C. 
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This exclusivity period belongs to first-filing ANDA 
applicants10 alone and is nontransferable. See id. 
§ 355(j)(5)(D); Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229. The period does 
not, however, prevent the brand-patentee from marketing its 
own “authorized generic.” Mylan Pharm., 454 F.3d at 276-
77; Teva Pharm. Indus., 410 F.3d at 55; see also Sanofi-
Aventis, 659 F.3d at 1175. 
  
II. 
A.11 
                                                                                                     
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I). But the parties appear to agree that 
because the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 
§ 1102(b)(1), amended Hatch-Waxman’s exclusivity 
provisions only for subsequent ANDAs, the exclusivity rules 
in place in 2002 control. See Teva Br. 8 & n.1. Under those 
rules, the 180-day period begins from the earlier of a 
generic’s launching “at risk” or a court’s finding the patent 
invalid or unenforceable. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) 
(2002). 
10 “[A]ccording to the Food and Drug Administration, all 
manufacturers who file on the first day are considered ‘first 
applicants’ who share the exclusivity period. Thus, if ten 
generics file an application to market a generic drug on the 
first day, all will be considered ‘first applicants.’” Actavis, 
133 S. Ct. at 2246 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb)).  
11 The facts recounted in this opinion are taken from the 
well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in plaintiffs’ 
16 
 
Plaintiffs, a putative class represented by King Drug 
Company of Florence, Inc., and Louisiana Wholesale Drug 
Co., Inc., are direct purchasers of Lamictal from Defendant 
GSK. GSK pioneered Lamictal, a brand-name drug used to 
treat epilepsy and bipolar disorder, and secured U.S. Patent 
No. 4,602,017 (“the ’017 patent”) on lamotrigine, Lamictal’s 
active ingredient. The patent expired on July 22, 2008. GSK 
sells both Lamictal tablets and Lamictal chewable tablets, 
although most Lamictal prescriptions are for the nonchewable 
tablets (most relevant here). Lamictal tablet sales exceeded $2 
billion between March 2007 and 2008, while chewable sales 
measured about $50 million over a yearlong span around 
2005.  
 
In April 2002, Defendant Teva filed the first paragraph 
IV ANDAs to market generic lamotrigine tablets and 
chewables. Teva certified that its proposed generics did not 
infringe the ’017 patent and/or that the ’017 patent was 
unenforceable. GSK soon sued in federal court, see 
Complaint, Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Teva Pharm. USA, 
Inc., No. 02-3779 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2002) (ECF No. 1), staying 
the FDA’s approval of Teva’s ANDAs for 30 months. In late 
January 2005, the parties tried the patent case before Judge 
Bissell, who ruled that the patent’s main claim, for the 
invention of lamotrigine, was invalid. Plaintiffs allege that “it 
was highly likely that Teva would prevail with respect to the 
remaining patent claims,” which “were extremely weak in 
view of Judge Bissell’s ruling that claim 1 was invalid.”  
 
                                                                                                     
Amended Complaint and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 
(2009).  
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In February 2005, the parties settled their dispute 
before Judge Bissell could rule on the validity of the ’017 
patent’s remaining claims. GSK agreed to allow Teva to 
market generic lamotrigine chewables by no later than June 1, 
2005, or 37 months before the patent was to expire on July 
22, 2008.12 GSK further agreed to permit Teva to sell generic 
lamotrigine tablets on July 21, 2008, if GSK received a 
“pediatric exclusivity” extension,13 or March 1, 2008, if GSK 
did not. (With a pediatric exclusivity extension, the patent 
would still have expired on July 22, 2008, but the FDA would 
have been foreclosed from approving ANDAs filed by 
competing generics until January 22, 2009. See generally 
AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 782 F.3d 1324, 1341, 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 2015).)  
 
Most relevant here, GSK also agreed not to market an 
authorized generic until January 2009, after Teva’s 180-day 
market exclusivity period was to expire (the “no-AG 
agreement” component of the settlement). In fact, plaintiffs 
allege, Teva “had an interest in delaying a final court decision 
finding the ’017 patent invalid” because the FDA had not yet 
approved Teva’s ANDAs, and Teva therefore wanted time to 
secure FDA approval so it could “take advantage of its 
valuable 180-day period,” which would have begun to run 
                                              
12 Because Teva’s ANDAs had not yet been approved, 
GSK also agreed to supply Teva with lamotrigine chewables.  
13 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355a(c)(2)(B) (2002) (then in 
effect) (providing for situations in which the FDA may not 
approve ANDAs for an additional six months if the patent 
holder completes certain studies “relating to the use of [the] 
drug in the pediatric population”).  
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with a final judgment finding the patent invalid or 
noninfringed.  
 
In exchange, Teva agreed to drop its litigation 
challenging GSK’s patent and, plaintiffs allege, delay its 
entry into the lamotrigine tablet market. If not for the 
consideration it received, plaintiffs allege, Teva would have 
launched its generic lamotrigine tablet “at risk” after 
receiving FDA approval (which occurred later, in August 
2006), even if Judge Bissell had not yet ruled the patent 
invalid (as, they allege, he was likely to do). Indeed, Teva 
was later to assert, in other litigation against GSK, that GSK’s 
no-AG agreement was “an important component of the 
settlement between the parties and formed part of the 
inducement to Teva to relinquish the rights and defenses it 
was asserting against GSK in the Patent Litigation.” JA 76 
(alteration and emphases omitted).14 Judge Bissell approved 
the parties’ settlement and dismissed the case on April 4, 
2005.  
 
B. 
                                              
14 In July 2008, “[j]ust prior to Teva launching its generic, 
GSK approached various pharmacies, group purchasing 
organizations, and long-term care facilities and proposed that 
they purchase and distribute GSK’s Lamictal at a generic 
product price.” Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., No. 08-3706, 2009 WL 1687457, at *2 
(D.N.J. June 16, 2009). Teva sued GSK to attempt to prevent 
GSK from “develop[ing] a generic of lamotrigine” because 
the parties’ settlement agreement “made clear that [Teva’s] 
right [to sell generic lamotrigine] was exclusive—including 
as to GSK and its affiliates.” Id. at *1, *4.  
19 
 
Plaintiffs here, direct purchasers of Lamictal from 
GSK, sued GSK and Teva in federal court in February 2012 
and filed their Consolidated Amended Class Action 
Complaint the following June. They allege that defendants, 
by their no-AG agreement—in effect, a “reverse payment” 
from GSK to Teva—violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by 
conspiring to delay generic competition for Lamictal tablets 
and section 2 by conspiring to monopolize the lamotrigine 
tablet market. GSK and Teva moved to dismiss, countering 
that, under our decision in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 
686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012),15 only cash payments constitute 
actionable “reverse payments.”  
 
In K-Dur, we charted a course different from that set 
by several other courts of appeals by rejecting the “scope of 
the patent” test, under which “a reverse payment settlement is 
immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive 
effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of 
the patent,” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (citation omitted). We 
reasoned that the scope-of-the-patent test “is contrary to the 
policies underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act and a long line of 
Supreme Court precedent on patent litigation and 
                                              
15 The Supreme Court later vacated K-Dur and remanded 
for reconsideration in light of Actavis, see Merck & Co. v. La. 
Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013); Upsher-Smith 
Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 
(2013). K-Dur was inconsistent with Actavis in that we had 
directed application of “quick look rule of reason analysis,” 
K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218, rather than the traditional, full-
fledged rule of reason standard that the Supreme Court 
subsequently decided is proper for reverse payment 
settlement agreements, see Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237-38. 
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competition.” K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214. Patents, we noted, are 
simply legal conclusions of the Patent Office. They should 
not be irrebuttably presumed valid, we said, especially given 
“the public interest support[ing] judicial testing and 
elimination of weak patents,” id. at 215-16, and “[t]he line 
that Congress drew [in Hatch-Waxman specifically] between 
the[] competing objectives” of promoting innovation and 
advancing the public interest, id. at 217. For these reasons, we 
held that rule of reason scrutiny is proper for reverse payment 
settlements. Id. at 218.16 
 
The District Court here focused on our limitation of K-
Dur to the pharmaceutical context, see id. at 216-18, and 
statements approving “settlements based on a negotiated entry 
date for marketing of the generic drug,” id. at 217-18, to 
restrict K-Dur’s reach to “settlements when a generic 
manufacturer is paid off with money, which is not the case 
here,” In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 
12-0995, 2012 WL 6725580, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2012). The 
court observed that Teva surely “received consideration,” or 
otherwise would have had “no incentive to settle,” but it 
viewed the parties’ settlement as “based on negotiated entry 
dates” rather than money. Id. Concluding the settlement was 
“not subject to antitrust scrutiny” under K-Dur, id., and that, 
“from a policy perspective, this settlement did introduce 
generic products onto the market sooner than what would 
have occurred had GSK’s patent not been challenged,” id. at 
*7, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.  
 
                                              
16 See supra note 15.  
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Plaintiffs appealed and we stayed proceedings pending 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis. After the Court’s 
decision, we remanded for further consideration in light of 
Actavis. In January 2014, the District Court “affirm[ed] its 
order of dismissal.” In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust 
Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 561 (D.N.J. 2014). Although 
conceding that “there is some very broad language in the 
[Actavis] opinion regarding patent settlements of all kinds,” 
id. at 566, the court read Actavis, as it had K-Dur before, as 
requiring antitrust scrutiny only of reverse payment patent 
settlements that “involve an exchange of money” rather than 
some other type of valuable consideration, id. at 568. In the 
alternative, the court stated, it “considered the settlement 
under the ‘five considerations’” of Actavis’s rule of reason 
and concluded that the settlement “would survive.” Id. at 570. 
 
III.17 
Plaintiffs contend that under Actavis antitrust scrutiny 
is not limited to reverse payments of cash. They assert the 
antitrust laws may be violated when a brand-name drug 
manufacturer induces a would-be generic competitor to delay 
market entry by agreeing not to launch an authorized generic 
to compete with the generic. Further, they argue, the District 
Court usurped the jury’s role in purporting to conduct a rule 
of reason analysis by applying the five considerations the 
                                              
17 The District Court had jurisdiction under section 4(a) of 
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 
and 1337. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 
exercise plenary review over a district court’s ruling on a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 
E.g., Byers v. Intuit, Inc., 600 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2010).  
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Actavis Court discussed to justify, not redefine, use of the 
already well-established rule of reason analysis. We will 
vacate and remand.  
 
A. 
As noted, in Actavis, the Supreme Court rejected the 
“scope of the patent” test, a categorical rule that reverse 
payment patent settlements in the Hatch-Waxman context 
were immune from antitrust scrutiny so long as the asserted 
anticompetitive effects fell within the scope of the patent. The 
Court held that “reverse payment settlements . . . can 
sometimes violate the antitrust laws,” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 
2227, because “[a]n unexplained large reverse payment itself 
would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts 
about the patent’s survival,” thereby “suggest[ing] that the 
payment’s objective is to maintain supracompetitive prices to 
be shared among the patentee and the challenger rather than 
face what might have been a competitive market,” id. at 2236. 
Consequently, the Court held, plaintiffs should be able to 
prove “[t]he existence and degree of any anticompetitive 
consequence” of such an agreement under the traditional rule-
of-reason test. Id. at 2237. 
 
Justice Breyer framed the issue of reverse payments 
then before the Court as follows: 
 
Company A sues Company B for patent 
infringement. The two companies settle under 
terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed 
infringer, not to produce the patented product 
until the patent’s term expires, and (2) 
Company A, the patentee, to pay B many 
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millions of dollars. Because the settlement 
requires the patentee to pay the alleged 
infringer, rather than the other way around, this 
kind of settlement agreement is often called a 
“reverse payment” settlement agreement. And 
the basic question here is whether such an 
agreement can sometimes unreasonably 
diminish competition in violation of the 
antitrust laws. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Sherman 
Act prohibition of “restraint[s] of trade or 
commerce”). Cf. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 
498 U.S. 46 (1990) (per curiam) (invalidating 
agreement not to compete). 
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227.  
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had 
applied its scope-of-the-patent test to the following facts. See 
id. at 2227; FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th 
Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223. Solvay 
Pharmaceuticals developed a brand-name drug called 
AndroGel in 1999 and obtained a relevant patent in 2003. 
Later in 2003, three would-be generic AndroGel 
manufacturers, Actavis first (soon followed by Paddock 
Laboratories and Par Pharmaceutical), filed ANDAs with 
paragraph IV certifications. Solvay sued. Thirty months into 
the litigation, the FDA approved Actavis’s first-filed ANDA. 
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229. 
 
The parties settled in 2006. Under the terms of the 
settlement,  
 
24 
 
Actavis agreed that it would not bring its 
generic to market until August 31, 2015, 65 
months before Solvay’s patent expired (unless 
someone else marketed a generic sooner). 
Actavis also agreed to promote AndroGel to 
urologists. The other generic manufacturers 
made roughly similar promises. And Solvay 
agreed to pay millions of dollars to each 
generic—$12 million in total to Paddock; $60 
million in total to Par; and an estimated $19–
$30 million annually, for nine years, to Actavis. 
The companies described these payments as 
compensation for other services the generics 
promised to perform, but the FTC contends the 
other services had little value.  
Id. (citations omitted).  
The FTC sued the settling manufacturers for violating 
the antitrust laws by agreeing to share Solvay’s monopoly 
profits. Id. at 2229-30. The FTC contended Solvay’s reverse 
payments to the generic manufacturers were compensation for 
the generics’ agreements not to compete with AndroGel. Id. 
at 2229. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
disagreed, and affirmed the dismissal of the FTC’s complaint, 
on the ground “that, absent sham litigation or fraud in 
obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune 
from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall 
within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.” 
Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d at 1312. In its view, “patent 
holder[s] had a lawful right to exclude others from the 
market.” Id. at 1307 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even 
though a patent might be found invalid if litigated, the court 
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thought “the FTC’s approach would put that burden back on 
the parties and the court, undo much of the benefit of settling 
patent litigation, and discourage settlements,” in derogation of 
the important public policy interests served by settlement. Id. 
at 1313-14. 
 
The Supreme Court disagreed. It began with the 
premise that an asserted patent “may or may not be valid, and 
may or may not be infringed.” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231. 
Although a valid patent gives its holder the right to 
“‘exclude[] all . . . from the use of the protected process or 
product’” and charge prices of its choosing, including 
supracompetitive prices, “an invalidated patent carries with it 
no such right. And even a valid patent confers no right to 
exclude products or processes that do not actually infringe.” 
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Line 
Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948)). And from the time 
of their paragraph IV certification, the generics in Actavis had 
challenged both the validity and the scope of the AndroGel 
patent. Id. The Court observed that, as alleged by the FTC, 
Solvay had “agreed to pay the [generics] many millions of 
dollars to stay out of its market, even though the [generics] 
did not have any claim that [Solvay] was liable to them for 
damages.” Id. The Court was concerned that this “unusual” 
“form of settlement” could “have significant adverse effects 
on competition” and thought, accordingly, “that patent and 
antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the ‘scope 
of the patent monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law 
immunity—that is conferred by a patent.” Id. 
 
The Court cited several of its earlier cases for this 
proposition that courts must balance “the lawful restraint on 
trade of the patent monopoly and the illegal restraint 
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prohibited broadly by the Sherman Act.” Id. (quoting Line 
Material, 333 U.S. at 310); see also United States v. U.S. 
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 390-91 (1948). The antitrust 
question, it reasoned, must be answered “by considering 
traditional antitrust factors such as likely anticompetitive 
effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and potentially 
offsetting legal considerations present in the circumstances, 
such as here those related to patents.” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 
2231. Only then can a court conclude “[w]hether a particular 
restraint lies ‘beyond the limits of the patent monopoly.’” Id. 
at 2231-32 (quoting id. at 2241-42 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting)). By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts, joined in 
dissent by Justices Scalia and Thomas, would have held that 
“the scope of the patent—i.e., the rights conferred by the 
patent—forms the zone within which the patent holder may 
operate without facing antitrust liability.” Id. at 2238 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In the dissenters’ view, “a patent 
holder acting within the scope of its patent does not engage in 
any unlawful anticompetitive behavior; it is simply exercising 
the monopoly rights granted to it by the Government.” Id. at 
2240. And, they maintained, the patent’s scope “should be 
determined by reference to patent law.” Id. (emphasis in 
original).  
 
As noted, the Court explained that its “precedents 
make clear that patent-related settlement agreements can 
sometimes violate the antitrust laws.” Id. at 2232 (majority 
opinion) (citing United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 
174 (1963); Line Material, 333 U.S. at 310-11; United States 
v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 378-80 (1952)). The 
Court viewed these prior cases as “seek[ing] to accommodate 
patent and antitrust policies, finding challenged terms and 
conditions unlawful unless patent law policy offsets the 
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antitrust law policy strongly favoring competition,” 
notwithstanding the possible validity or infringement of the 
patent in question. Id. at 2233; see id. at 2244 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“The majority seems to think that even if the 
patent is valid, a patent holder violates the antitrust laws 
merely because the settlement took away some chance that 
his patent would be declared invalid by a court.” (emphasis in 
original)). Rejecting the dissent’s view “that a patent holder 
may simply ‘pa[y] a competitor to respect its patent’ and quit 
its patent invalidity or noninfringement claim without any 
antitrust scrutiny whatever,” id. at 2233 (majority opinion) 
(alteration in original) (quoting id. at 2239 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting)), the Court reasoned that “[t]he dissent does not 
identify any patent statute that it understands to grant such a 
right to a patentee, whether expressly or by fair implication,” 
id. Such a right, the Court thought, “would be difficult to 
reconcile . . . with the patent-related policy of eliminating 
unwarranted patent grants so the public will not ‘continually 
be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without 
need or justification.’” Id. (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 
U.S. 653, 670 (1969)).18  
                                              
18 Unlike the majority, the dissenters read the Court’s 
precedents to stand for the proposition that a patentee’s 
actions are subject to antitrust scrutiny only when they “go 
beyond the monopoly powers conferred by the patent,” with 
just two exceptions—settlement of sham litigation and 
litigation involving patents obtained by fraud on the Patent 
and Trademark Office. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2239 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 2241-42. No case cited by the 
majority, they said, subjected a patent settlement “to antitrust 
scrutiny merely because the validity of the patent was 
uncertain,” and no reference to “a ‘general procompetitive 
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The Court further explained that its holding should not 
be read to subject to antitrust scrutiny “commonplace forms” 
of settlement, such as tender by an infringer of less than the 
patentee’s full demand. See id. But reverse payments, it said, 
are not such “familiar settlement forms.” Id. In a reverse 
payment settlement, the patentee “pays money . . . purely so 
[the alleged infringer] will give up the patent fight.” Id. These 
payments are said to flow in “reverse” because “a party with 
no claim for damages (something that is usually true of a 
paragraph IV litigation defendant) walks away with money 
simply so it will stay away from the patentee’s market. That,” 
the Court thought, “is something quite different,” and 
something that falls outside accepted “traditional examples” 
of settlement. Id. 
 
Notwithstanding the potential concern “that antitrust 
scrutiny of a reverse payment agreement would require the 
parties to litigate the validity of the patent in order to 
demonstrate what would have happened to competition in the 
absence of the settlement,” the Court identified “five sets of 
considerations” militating in favor of permitting antitrust 
scrutiny. Id. at 2234. First, the Court saw in reverse payments 
the “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.” Id. 
(quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 
(1986)). The inference may be drawn from a reverse payment 
that the patent holder is paying the alleged infringer to defend 
                                                                                                     
thrust’” of the Hatch-Waxman Act should be interpreted “to 
unsettle the established relationship between patent and 
antitrust law,” especially when “Congress has repeatedly 
declined to enact legislation addressing the issue.” Id. at 2242 
(quoting id. at 2234 (majority opinion)). 
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“a right it already claims but would lose if the patent litigation 
were to continue and the patent were held invalid or not 
infringed by the generic product.” Id. Even though other 
settlement terms might allow a generic challenger to enter the 
market prior to patent expiration, and thus permit some 
competition benefiting consumers, a reverse payment 
inducing delay—i.e., a “payment in return for staying out of 
the market—simply keeps prices at patentee-set 
[supracompetitive] levels . . . while dividing that return 
between the challenged patentee and the patent challenger.” 
Id. at 2234-35.  
 
Second, the Court thought “these anticompetitive 
consequences will at least sometimes prove unjustified.” Id. 
at 2235-36. Although a payment may be justified if, for 
example, it approximates litigation expenses saved by the 
settlement or is true “compensation for other services that the 
generic has promised to perform,” it may not be justified 
when used “to prevent the risk of competition” by eliminating 
“the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of 
noninfringement.” Id. at 2236; see also, e.g., id. (noting that 
the antitrust harm occurs when “the payment’s objective is to 
maintain supracompetitive prices to be shared among the 
patentee and the challenger rather than face what might have 
been a competitive market—the very anticompetitive 
consequence that underlies the claim of antitrust 
unlawfulness”). At the same time, the Court did not rule out 
other justifications.  
 
Third, the Court reasoned, in reverse payment 
situations “the patentee likely possesses the power to bring” 
about this anticompetitive harm. Id. Not only does a patent 
protect such market power, but the size of a reverse payment 
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may serve as a proxy for this power because a firm without 
such power (and the supracompetitive profits that power 
enables) is unlikely to buy off potential competitors. Id. 
Fourth, “the size of the unexplained reverse payment 
can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all 
without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of 
the validity of the patent itself.” Id. at 2236-37. Instead, the 
anticompetitive harm from such a payment appears not to be 
that the patentee is reaping supracompetitive monopoly 
profits from a decidedly invalid or noninfringed patent, but 
rather that there is a risk that the patent-enabled monopoly is 
unwarranted, and foreclosing such a challenge harms 
consumers. See id. at 2236 (“[T]he payment (if otherwise 
unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition. 
And, as we have said, that consequence constitutes the 
relevant anticompetitive harm.”).19 
 
Fifth, parties may still find other ways to settle, such as 
“by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee’s 
market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the patentee 
paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.” Id. at 
2237. The Court emphasized, however, that “[i]f the basic 
reason [for the reverse payment] is a desire to maintain and to 
share patent-generated monopoly profits, then, in the absence 
of some other justification, the antitrust laws are likely to 
forbid the arrangement.” Id.  
                                              
19 See also, e.g., Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2244 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“The majority seems to think that even if the 
patent is valid, a patent holder violates the antitrust laws 
merely because the settlement took away some chance that 
his patent would be declared invalid by a court.” (emphasis in 
original)).  
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The Court concluded that, because of the fact-specific 
nature and the complexity of reverse payment agreements, 
courts should apply the traditional rule-of-reason analysis. 
See id. at 2237-38. 
B. 
We do not believe Actavis’s holding can be limited to 
reverse payments of cash. For the following reasons, we think 
that a no-AG agreement, when it represents an unexplained 
large transfer of value from the patent holder to the alleged 
infringer, may be subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of 
reason. We find the allegations here sufficient to state such a 
claim under the Sherman Act.20  
 
1. 
In the Actavis Court’s view, reverse payments are 
problematic because of their potential to negatively impact 
consumer welfare by preventing the risk of competition, 
which arises from expected litigation outcomes. See Actavis, 
133 S. Ct. at 2236. The Court’s reasoning was not that reverse 
payments per se violate the antitrust laws, or are per se 
anticompetitive. To the contrary, the Court declined to 
“abandon[] . . . the ‘rule of reason’ in favor of presumptive 
rules (or a ‘quick-look’ approach),” which are “appropriate 
only where an observer with even a rudimentary 
understanding of economics could conclude that the 
arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive 
effect on customers and markets.” Id. at 2237 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Instead, the Court focused on 
                                              
20 See supra note 3; infra note 35.  
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whether a reverse payment could have an anticompetitive 
effect or, alternatively, whether it was reasonable 
compensation for litigation costs or the value of services. In 
other words, the Court reasoned that “even a small risk of 
invalidity” may not justify a “large payment” (presumably 
enabled by “patent-generated monopoly profits”) that “likely 
seeks to prevent the risk of competition.” Id. at 2236. And, 
the Court reiterated, it is the prevention of that risk of 
competition—eliminating “the risk of patent invalidation or a 
finding of noninfringement” by “paying the challenger to stay 
out” of the market (for longer than the patent’s strength 
would otherwise allow)—that “constitutes the relevant 
anticompetitive harm,” which must then be analyzed under 
the rule of reason. Id. at 2236-37.  
 
It seems to us that no-AG agreements are likely to 
present the same types of problems as reverse payments of 
cash. The no-AG agreement here may be of great monetary 
value to Teva as the first-filing generic. In Actavis, the 
Supreme Court recognized generally that the 180-day 
exclusivity period is “possibly ‘worth several hundred million 
dollars,’” and may be where the bulk of the first-filer’s profits 
lie. Id. at 2229 (quoting C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: 
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design 
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553, 1579 (2006)).21 There are 
                                              
21 In addition, a comprehensive FTC study suggests that 
having to compete with an authorized generic will likely both 
cut the generic’s sales and force down its price: “the presence 
of authorized generic competition reduces the first-filer 
generic’s revenues by 40 to 52 percent, on average.” FTC, 
Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term Effects and Long-
Term Impact iii (2011), available at 
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also plausible indicia that this pattern held true here: The 
Amici States point out that “[p]ublic records show that 
generic sales of Lamictal in 2008 were some 671 million 
dollars,” so the no-AG agreement “was clearly worth millions 
of dollars, if not hundreds of millions of dollars[,] to the 
generic.” Amici States’ Br. 16. And the FTC suggests, using 
sales of the drug Paxil as a yardstick, that GSK’s no-AG 
agreement would have been worth hundreds of millions of 
dollars to Teva. Appellants’ Br. 24.22  
                                                                                                     
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/2011genericdrugreport.pdf; 
see FTC Amicus Br. 8 (“Prices fall further when additional 
generic competitors enter . . . .” (citing FTC, Pay-for-Delay: 
How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions 8 
(2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf); 
FTC Amicus Br. 12 (“[G]eneric wholesale prices average 70 
percent of the pre-entry brand-name drug price when the first-
filer faces an AG, compared to 80 percent of the brand price 
when it does not.” (citing FTC, Authorized Generic Drugs, 
supra, at iii)).  
22 “The U.S. sales of Paxil were roughly equivalent to 
those of Lamictal in the year before each product faced 
generic competition ($2.3 billion and $2.2 billion, 
respectively).” Appellants’ Br. 24 (quoting FTC Br. as 
Amicus Curiae at 8, Lamictal, 18 F. Supp. 3d. 560 (ECF No. 
89-3)). The magnitude of these figures is proportionate to the 
estimated $2.6 billion average cost of developing a new 
brand-name drug. See Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev., 
Briefing: Cost of Developing a New Drug (Nov. 18, 2014), 
available at 
http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/Tufts_CSDD_briefing_on_
RD_cost_study_-_Nov_18,_2014..pdf.  
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At the same time, a brand’s commitment not to 
produce an authorized generic means that it must give up the 
valuable right to capture profits in the new two-tiered market. 
The no-AG agreement transfers the profits the patentee would 
have made from its authorized generic to the settling 
generic—plus potentially more, in the form of higher prices, 
because there will now be a generic monopoly instead of a 
generic duopoly. Thus, “the source of the benefit to the 
claimed infringer is something costly to the patentee.” Aaron 
Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, Antitrust, Fall 2013, at 16, 22 
n.22. Absent a no-AG promise, launching an authorized 
generic would seem to be economically rational for the brand. 
For this reason, the fact that the brand promises not to launch 
an authorized generic (thereby giving up considerable value 
to the settling generic) makes the settlement something more 
than just an agreed-upon early entry: it “may instead provide 
strong evidence that the patentee seeks to induce the generic 
challenger to abandon its claim with a share of its monopoly 
profits that would otherwise be lost in the competitive 
market.” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235.  
 
The anticompetitive consequences of this pay-for-
delay may be as harmful as those resulting from reverse 
payments of cash. If the brand uses a no-AG agreement to 
induce the generic to abandon the patent fight, the chance of 
dissolving a questionable patent vanishes (and along with it, 
the prospects of a more competitive market). As with a 
reverse payment of cash, a brand agreeing not to produce an 
authorized generic may thereby have “avoid[ed] the risk of 
patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement.” Id. at 
2236. In addition, when the parties’ settlement includes a no-
AG agreement, the generic also presumably agrees to an early 
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entry date that is later than it would have otherwise 
accepted.23 And during this time, the brand’s monopoly 
remains in force. Once the generic enters, moreover, it faces 
no competition with other generics at all.  
 
Antitrust law is designed to protect consumers from 
arrangements that prevent competition in the marketplace. 
See, e.g., Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234-35; id. at 2238 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting); accord XII Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, 
¶ 2046c (2014 Supp.). The District Court here held that “the 
Supreme Court considered a reverse payment to involve an 
exchange of money” because “when the Supreme Court said 
‘payment’ it meant a payment of money.” Lamictal, 18 F. 
Supp. 3d at 568. But, we think, a no-AG agreement could 
likewise “prevent the risk of competition.” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2236; cf. XII Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 2046c1 (2014 
Supp.) (explaining that under a “pay-for-delay settlement . . . 
consumer welfare remains the same as it would be under 
continued monopoly production by a single firm”); FTC 
Amicus Br. 22 (“It is not the transfer of cash or the form of 
reverse payment that triggers antitrust concern; it is the 
impact of that payment on consumer welfare.”). We do not 
                                              
23 When parties compromise on an early-entry date 
alone—rather than an early-entry date plus valuable 
consideration—it is possible that they may compromise on an 
early-entry date reflecting their assessment of the strength of 
the patent. The concern with combining an early-entry date 
with the valuable consideration of a no-AG agreement is that 
the generic manufacturer may be willing to accept a later 
early-entry date without any corresponding benefit to 
consumers.  
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believe the Court intended to draw such a formal line.24 Nor 
did the Actavis Court limit its reasoning or holding to cash 
payments only.25  
 
2. 
Defendants contend that no-AG agreements are 
distinguishable from reverse payments because they are in 
essence “exclusive licenses” and patent law expressly 
                                              
24 Cf., e.g., Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 
U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) (“[D]eparture from the rule-of-reason 
standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect 
rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.”); United States 
v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The 
Supreme Court on more than one occasion has emphasized 
that economic realities rather than a formalistic approach 
must govern review of antitrust activity.” (citing Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 
(1992))); Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 
Iowa L. Rev. 7, 41-44 (2014).  
25 The dissent recognized the majority’s reasoning could 
reach noncash transactions. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2239 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“As in any settlement, Solvay 
gave its competitors something of value (money) and, in 
exchange, its competitors gave it something of value 
(dropping their legal claims).”); id. at 2245 (“[The majority’s] 
logic . . . cannot possibly be limited to reverse-payment 
agreements . . . . The Government’s brief acknowledges as 
much, suggesting that if antitrust scrutiny is invited for such 
cash payments, it may also be required for ‘other 
consideration’ and ‘alternative arrangements.’”).  
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contemplates exclusive licenses.26 They argue the Actavis 
Court rejected the dissent’s arguments in part because the 
dissent could “not identify any patent statute that it 
understands to grant such a right to a patentee, whether 
expressly or by fair implication.” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2233; 
see GSK Br. 22-23, 34; Teva Br. 22-26. They suggest that if 
“the patent statute specifically gives a right to restrain 
competition in the manner challenged,” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 
2231 (internal quotation marks omitted), such conduct is 
immune from antitrust scrutiny. See GSK Br. 22-23; Teva Br. 
22-26, 34. In short, defendants argue GSK’s concession not to 
produce an authorized generic during Teva’s 180-day 
exclusivity period is an “exclusive license” exempt from 
antitrust scrutiny.  
 
But the “right” defendants seek is not in fact a 
patentee’s right to grant licenses, exclusive or otherwise.27 
                                              
26 See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“The . . . patentee, or his assigns 
or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey 
an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, 
to the whole or any specified part of the United States.”).  
27 We do not believe the no-AG agreement was in fact an 
“exclusive” license. “Ordinarily, to say that a licensee’s right 
is exclusive is to mean that no one other than that licensee, 
not even the licensor/patentee, may practice the patent.” III 
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 707a (3d ed. 2008). Here, of 
course, the no-AG agreement permitted both the patentee 
(GSK) and the challenger (Teva) to make bioequivalent 
drugs. Because both GSK and Teva could practice the patent, 
Teva’s license was therefore not exclusive, but rather 
imposed a restriction on the patentee that prevented a certain 
form of competition (on bioequivalent drugs labeled 
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Instead, it is a right to use valuable licensing in such a way as 
to induce a patent challenger’s delay. The Actavis Court 
rejected the latter. The thrust of the Court’s reasoning is not 
that it is problematic that money is used to effect an end to the 
patent challenge, but rather that the patentee leverages some 
part of its patent power (in Actavis, its supracompetitive 
profits) to cause anticompetitive harm—namely, elimination 
of the risk of competition. There, the patentee gave the 
challenger a license to enter 65 months before patent 
expiration, plus a reverse payment of “millions of dollars.” 
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229. This reverse payment was not 
immunized, of course, simply because of that early-entry 
                                                                                                     
“generics”). And, as we have said before, “Where the license 
restriction results primarily in benefits for the licensees rather 
than the patentee, the anticompetitive restriction cannot be 
justified as a subsidy for the patentee’s inventive activity.” 
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 
1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1979). Indeed, “[p]atents give no 
protection from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act . . . when 
the licenses are used, as here, in the scheme to restrain.” New 
Wrinkle, 342 U.S. at 378; see also, e.g., Moraine Prods. v. 
ICI Am., Inc., 538 F.2d 134, 145 (7th Cir. 1976) (“Where a 
patent license is used to protect the licensee in addition to the 
patentee or is used to allow the licensees to divide a market 
among themselves, thus enabling them jointly to regiment an 
industry under the guise of a patent license, there is good 
reason to declare such a restrictive scheme illegal.”). The 
Actavis Court reaffirmed this broader principle. See, e.g., 133 
S. Ct. at 2231 (“[P]atent and antitrust policies are both 
relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—
and consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred 
by a patent.”).  
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“license.” Similarly, the fact that a patent holder may 
generally have the right to grant licenses, exclusive or 
otherwise, does not mean it also has the right to give a 
challenger a license along with a promise not to produce an 
authorized generic—i.e., a promise not to compete—in order 
to induce the challenger “to respect its patent and quit [the 
competitor’s] patent invalidity or noninfringement claim 
without any antitrust scrutiny.” Id. at 2233 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). In the Actavis Court’s view, the question is 
not one of patent law, but of antitrust law, the latter of which 
invalidates “the improper use of [a patent] monopoly.” Id. at 
2231 (alteration in original) (quoting Line Material, 333 U.S. 
at 310). But see id. at 2243 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). And as 
we read the Court’s opinion, even exclusive licenses cannot 
avoid antitrust scrutiny where they are used in 
anticompetitive ways. See id. at 2227 (citing Palmer, 498 
U.S. 46); Palmer, 498 U.S. at 50 (holding an agreement not to 
compete based on an exclusive copyright license28 “unlawful 
on its face”). We make no statement about patent licensing 
more generally. But in this context we believe the fact that the 
Patent Act expressly authorizes licensing does not necessarily 
                                              
28 The Supreme Court opinion does not say what kind of 
“exclusive license” it is referring to, but the Eleventh 
Circuit’s opinion states, “BRG and HBJ disavow any intent to 
restrain trade and claim that their agreement is nothing more 
than an ordinary copyright royalty arrangement which courts 
have routinely sustained.” Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 874 
F.2d 1417, 1434 (11th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), rev’d, 498 U.S. 46. 
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mean it also authorizes reverse payments to prevent generic 
competition.29 
We also disagree with defendants’ attempt to 
recharacterize Teva’s gain as resulting from its early entry 
alone. First, that characterization is inaccurate as a descriptive 
matter: What GSK gave Teva was a 180-day monopoly over 
the generic market. The first-filing generic cannot capture this 
value by early entry alone. It can only hope to obtain this 
value with the brand’s self-restraint, and here, without GSK’s 
no-AG commitment, GSK allegedly would have introduced 
an AG. Second, although we agree that the Actavis “Court 
                                              
29 The defendants’ arguments are much like those rejected 
by the majority in Actavis. The disagreement in the Court was 
fundamental. In the dissenters’ view, “a patent claim cannot 
possibly impose unlawful anticompetitive harm if the patent 
holder is acting within the scope of a valid patent and 
therefore permitted to do precisely what the antitrust suit 
claims is unlawful.” 133 S. Ct. at 2244 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (emphasis in original). The dissenters viewed the 
majority as “impos[ing] antitrust liability based on the 
parties’ subjective uncertainty about [a] legal conclusion,” 
namely, whether a patent is valid (and it is one or the other), 
because “[t]he majority seems to think that even if the patent 
is valid, a patent holder violates the antitrust laws merely 
because the settlement took away some chance that his patent 
would be declared invalid by a court.” Id. (emphasis in 
original). In fact, the dissenters perceived a slippery slope in 
that the majority’s “logic—that taking away any chance that a 
patent will be invalidated is itself an antitrust problem—
cannot possibly be limited to reverse-payment agreements, or 
those that are ‘large.’” Id. at 2245 (emphasis in original) 
(quoting id. at 2236 (majority opinion)).  
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expressly identified early-entry licensing as a traditional form 
of settlement whose legality the opinion took pains not to 
disturb,” Teva Br. 25-26,30 a no-AG agreement is no more 
solely an early-entry licensing agreement than the settlement 
in Actavis itself, where entry was permitted 65 months before 
patent expiration. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229. 
Notwithstanding such “early entry,” the antitrust problem was 
that, as the Court inferred, entry might have been earlier, 
and/or the risk of competition not eliminated, had the reverse 
payment not been tendered. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237 
(“They may, as in other industries, settle in other ways, for 
example, by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the 
patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the 
patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to that 
point.”); see also FTC Amicus Br. 21-22 (“[C]ompetitors do 
not normally raise antitrust concerns if they agree on a date 
for generic entry but do not simultaneously agree that the 
brand-name manufacturer will compensate the generic 
company for staying out of the market until that date, thereby 
sharing (while enlarging) their aggregate pool of monopoly 
profits.”).  
 
3. 
Defendants present additional arguments as to why no-
AG agreements, as “exclusive licenses,” should not be 
subjected to antitrust scrutiny. Noting that public policy 
                                              
30 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237; cf. K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 
217-18 (“[N]othing in the rule of reason test that we adopt 
here limits the ability of the parties to reach settlements based 
on a negotiated entry date for marketing of the generic 
drug . . . .”).  
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favors settlements, they contend that subjecting such 
agreements to scrutiny will discourage settlements. GSK Br. 
37. Furthermore, they contend that “courts should not review 
pro-competitive conduct to determine whether an even more 
pro-competitive transaction exists.” GSK Br. 37 (citing 
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415-16 (2004) (“The Sherman Act . . . 
does not give judges carte blanche to insist that a monopolist 
alter its way of doing business whenever some other approach 
might yield greater competition.” (citation omitted))); see 
Teva Br. 32. 
 
But Actavis addressed and rejected these arguments. 
First, the Court thought the possible discouragement of 
settlements was “outweigh[ed]” by other considerations and 
stated that “parties may well find ways to settle patent 
disputes without the use of reverse payments.” Actavis, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2237.31 But whatever the effect on settlements, we do 
                                              
31 The Court was unpersuaded by the dissenters’ 
arguments in this vein. The dissenters contended there was no 
empirical evidence that most reverse payment settlements 
occur in the Hatch-Waxman context, and that payments from 
patentee to alleged infringer “are a well-known feature of 
intellectual property litigation, and reflect an intuitive way to 
settle such disputes.” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2242-43 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting). The Court, however, thought that 
“[a]pparently most if not all reverse payment settlement 
agreements arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug 
regulation, and specifically in the context of suits brought 
under statutory provisions allowing a generic drug 
manufacturer (seeking speedy marketing approval) to 
challenge the validity of a patent owned by an already-
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not perceive how the noncash nature of no-AG agreements 
alters that balance. Second, we think Trinko inapposite. 
Actavis does not stand for the proposition that parties must 
reach the most procompetitive settlements possible. Instead, 
we read Actavis to hold that antitrust law may prohibit 
settlements that are anticompetitive because, without 
justification, they delay competition for longer than the 
patent’s strength would otherwise permit.32  
                                                                                                     
approved brand-name drug owner.” Id. at 2227 (majority 
opinion). Similarly, although the dissenters contended that 
“[w]hile the alleged infringer may not be suing for the patent 
holder’s money, it is suing for the right to use and market the 
(intellectual) property, which is worth money,” id. at 2243 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original), the Court 
thought reverse payments “unusual,” id. at 2231 (majority 
opinion). The dissenters also thought that the Court’s holding 
would discourage settlement even though “the right to settle 
generally accompanies the right to litigate in the first place.” 
Id. at 2243 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). They postulated that 
“the majority’s decision may very well discourage generics 
from challenging pharmaceutical patents in the first place” by 
“[t]aking the prospect of settlements off the table—or limiting 
settlements to an earlier entry date for the generic, which may 
still be many years in the future.” Id. at 2247.  
32 In addition, Trinko dealt with different questions 
regarding unlawful monopolization and the refusal to deal—
set against the background of “the long recognized right of [a] 
trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private 
business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as 
to parties with whom he will deal,” 540 U.S. at 408 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Colgate & 
Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919))—and the role of the 
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4. 
For the reasons we have explained, we think this no-
AG agreement, because it may represent an unusual, 
unexplained transfer of value from the patent holder to the 
alleged infringer that cannot be adequately justified—whether 
as compensation for litigation expenses or services, or 
otherwise33—is subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of 
reason. But even if that is the rule, defendants contend, 
plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 (2009), because their “allegations are far too 
speculative to satisfy their burden of plausibly alleging that 
the settlement was anticompetitive.” See GSK Br. 44-45. In 
particular, defendants argue that “[p]laintiffs fail to plausibly 
allege that in this but-for world, the parties would have 
successfully negotiated an alternative, competition-
maximizing agreement,” Teva Br. 44; that continued 
litigation in favor of settlement “would have yielded a more 
competitive result,” Teva Br. 45; or that Teva would have 
launched their generics “at risk,” Teva Br. 46. 
 
We believe plaintiffs’ allegations, and the plausible 
inferences that can be drawn from them, are sufficient to state 
a rule-of-reason claim under Twombly and Iqbal for violation 
of the Sherman Act on the ground that GSK sought to induce 
Teva to delay its entry into the lamotrigine tablet market by 
                                                                                                     
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which focuses on a 
different goal of eliminating certain monopolies, id. at 415.  
33 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236 (“There may be other 
justifications.”).  
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way of an unjustified no-AG agreement. As recited earlier, 
plaintiffs alleged that GSK agreed not to launch a competing 
authorized generic during Teva’s 180-day exclusivity period, 
which was to begin near the expiration of the ’017 patent; that 
such promises can be worth “many millions of dollars of 
additional revenue”; that “GSK had an incentive to launch its 
own authorized generic versions of tablets”; that Teva had a 
history of launching “at risk”; and that the ’017 patent was 
likely to be invalidated—as, in fact, its main claim had been. 
Because marketing an authorized generic was allegedly in 
GSK’s economic interest, its agreement not to launch an 
authorized generic was an inducement—valuable to both it 
and Teva—to ensure a longer period of supracompetitive 
monopoly profits based on a patent at risk of being found 
invalid or not infringed. (Indeed, Teva asserted in other 
litigation that the no-AG agreement “formed part of the 
inducement to Teva to relinquish the rights and defenses it 
was asserting against GSK in the Patent Litigation.” JA 76 
(alteration and emphases omitted).) And although plaintiffs 
concede that Teva entered the lamotrigine chewables market 
about 37 months early, see, e.g., GSK Br. 7, the chewables 
market, allegedly worth only $50 million annually, was 
orders of magnitude smaller than the alleged $2 billion tablet 
market the agreement is said to have protected. Accordingly, 
at the pleading stage plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that 
any procompetitive aspects of the chewables arrangement 
were outweighed by the anticompetitive harm from the no-
AG agreement.34  
                                              
34 It may also be (though we do not decide) that 
“procompetitive effects in one market cannot justify 
anticompetitive effects in a separate market” (i.e., the 
lamotrigine tablet market). Amicus Br. Nat’l Ass’n Chain 
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Moreover, we do not read Actavis to require 
allegations that defendants could in fact have reached another, 
more competitive settlement. Actavis embraces the concept 
that a patent “may or may not be valid, and may or may not 
be infringed,” 133 S. Ct. at 2231, and holds that the 
anticompetitive harm is not certain consumer loss through 
higher prices, but rather the patentee’s “avoid[ance of] the 
risk of patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement”—
that is, “prevent[ion of] the risk of competition,” id. at 2236, 
beyond what the patent’s strength would otherwise allow—
and, thus, consumer harm. In other words, under the 
substantive standard, the question is not whether the 
defendants have only possibly acted unlawfully, but see Teva 
Br. 43, but whether they have acted unlawfully by seeking to 
prevent competition. Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded as 
much.35  
                                                                                                     
Drug Stores in Support of Appellants 27-28 (citing, inter alia, 
Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 
1157 n.11 (9th Cir. 2003)); see Paladin Assocs., 328 F.3d at 
1157 n.11 (“It may be . . . that this procompetitive effect 
should not be considered in our rule of reason analysis, based 
on the theory that procompetitive effects in a separate market 
cannot justify anti-competitive effects in the market for 
pipeline transportation under analysis.”) (citing United States 
v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); see also Topco, 
405 U.S. at 610 (“[Competition] cannot be foreclosed with 
respect to one sector of the economy because certain private 
citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might 
promote greater competition in a more important sector of the 
economy.”).  
35 We do not decide the question of antitrust injury in 
private actions such as this litigation, see generally, e.g., Ian 
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C. 
1. 
In the alternative, the District Court stated that “[i]t 
finds that the settlement . . . would survive Actavis scrutiny 
and is reasonable.” 18 F. Supp. 3d at 570. This was error. As 
explained above, plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded violation 
of the antitrust laws so as to overcome defendants’ motion to 
dismiss. If genuine issues of material fact remain after 
discovery, the rule-of-reason analysis is for the finder of fact, 
not the court as a matter of law.36  
 
In addition, the District Court mistook the “five sets of 
considerations” that persuaded the Actavis Court “to conclude 
that the FTC should have been given the opportunity to prove 
                                                                                                     
Simmons et al., Viewing FTC v. Actavis Through the Lens of 
Clayton Act Section 4, Antitrust, Fall 2013, at 24; In re 
Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 755-77 (E.D. Pa. 
2014), nor do we preclude the parties from raising the issue 
on remand.  
36 See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 
U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (“[T]he rule of reason requires the 
factfinder to decide whether under all the circumstances of 
the case the restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable 
restraint on competition.”); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust 
Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 316 & n.12 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing 
the fact-bound, burden-shifting standard and noting that “[i]n 
the event a genuinely disputed issue of fact exists regarding 
the reasonableness of the restraint, the determination is for the 
jury”).  
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its antitrust claim” under the rule of reason, 133 S. Ct. at 
2234, as a redefinition of the “rule of reason” itself. But the 
general contours of the rule of reason are well-mapped. See 
generally, e.g., id. at 2236 (citing Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 
U.S. at 459); Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 
F.3d 820, 829-30 (3d Cir. 2010). We recognize the Actavis 
Court “le[ft] to the lower courts the structuring of [this type 
of] rule-of-reason antitrust litigation,” 133 S. Ct. at 2238, and 
that there may be some uncertainty as to how, exactly, a 
“defendant may show in the antitrust proceeding that 
legitimate justifications are present, thereby explaining the 
presence of the challenged term and showing the lawfulness 
of that term under the rule of reason,” id. at 2236 (citing Ind. 
Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459). But the Court noted that 
justifications might include “litigation expenses saved 
through the settlement” or “compensation for other services 
that the generic has promised to perform.” Id. And although 
the Court left such details of how to apply the proper antitrust 
theories to “the basic question—that of the presence of 
significant unjustified anticompetitive consequences,” id. at 
2238—it suggested “the antitrust laws are likely to forbid” 
payment for delay (or, that is, to eliminate risk of patent 
invalidity or noninfringement), id. at 2237.  
 
Here, the District Court thought the no-AG agreement 
was “justified” because, although the settlement amount was 
likely greater than litigation costs, “the consideration which 
the parties exchanged in the settlement [wa]s reasonably 
related to the removal of the uncertainty created by the 
dispute.” Lamictal, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 570. That conclusion is 
in tension with Actavis in that, without proper justification, 
the brand cannot pay the generic simply to eliminate the risk 
of competition. Nor did the court properly conclude “that the 
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potential for adverse effects on competition [wa]s minimal,” 
or that the settlement was reasonable, because “the duration 
of the No-AG Agreement was a relatively brief six months.” 
Id. The anticompetitive harm plaintiffs allege—consistent 
with Actavis—is that the promise of no authorized-generic 
competition during those six months induced Teva to quit its 
patent challenge. As discussed above, plaintiffs plausibly 
allege this no-AG promise was of considerable value and thus 
designed to protect GSK’s patents against the risk of 
invalidation or noninfringement, rather than reimburse 
litigation costs or compensate for services. Accordingly, the 
District Court should have permitted the litigation to proceed 
under the traditional rule-of-reason approach.  
 
2. 
Under the traditional rule-of-reason analysis, the 
factfinder must  
 
weigh all of the circumstances of a case in 
deciding whether a restrictive practice should be 
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable 
restraint on competition. The plaintiff bears an 
initial burden under the rule of reason of 
showing that the alleged combination or 
agreement produced adverse, anti-competitive 
effects within the relevant product and 
geographic markets. The plaintiff may satisfy 
this burden by proving the existence of actual 
anticompetitive effects, such as reduction of 
output, increase in price, or deterioration in 
quality of goods or services. Such proof is often 
impossible to make, however, due to the 
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difficulty of isolating the market effects of 
challenged conduct. Accordingly, courts 
typically allow proof of the defendant’s market 
power instead. Market power, the ability to 
raise prices above those that would prevail in a 
competitive market, is essentially a surrogate 
for detrimental effects.  
If a plaintiff meets his initial burden of 
adducing adequate evidence of market power or 
actual anti-competitive effects, the burden shifts 
to the defendant to show that the challenged 
conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive 
objective. . . . To rebut, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the restraint is not reasonably 
necessary to achieve the stated objective.  
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668-69 (3d Cir. 
1993) (alteration, citations, internal quotation marks, and 
footnotes omitted).  
 
The Actavis Court provided initial guidance on how to 
structure rule-of-reason litigation in the reverse payment 
context. The Court explained that such antitrust questions 
must be answered “by considering traditional antitrust factors 
such as likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, 
market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations 
present in the circumstances, such as here those related to 
patents.” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.  
 
First, to prove anticompetitive effects, the plaintiff 
must prove payment for delay, or, in other words, payment to 
prevent the risk of competition. See id. at 2235-36. “[T]he 
likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about 
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anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its scale in 
relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its 
independence from other services for which it might represent 
payment, and the lack of any other convincing justification.” 
Id. at 2237.  
 
Second, the burden then shifts to the defendant to 
show “that legitimate justifications are present, thereby 
explaining the presence of the challenged term and showing 
the lawfulness of that term under the rule of reason.” Id. at 
2235-36.  
The reverse payment, for example, may amount 
to no more than a rough approximation of the 
litigation expenses saved through the 
settlement. That payment may reflect 
compensation for other services that the generic 
has promised to perform—such as distributing 
the patented item or helping to develop a market 
for that item. There may be other justifications.  
Id. at 2236. The Court does not foreclose other justifications, 
and we need not decide today what those other justifications 
might be.  
 
Finally, the plaintiff will have the opportunity to rebut 
the defendant’s explanation.37  
 
                                              
37 See generally, e.g., King Drug Co. of Florence v. 
Cephalon, Inc., --- F. Supp. 3d ----, ----, No. 06-1797, 2015 
WL 356913, at *7-16 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2015).  
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On remand, we invite the District Court to proceed 
with the litigation under the traditional rule of reason, 
tailored, as necessary, to the circumstances of this case.38  
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of 
the District Court and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
                                              
38 We note that the rule of reason allows the court, 
depending on the circumstances, to  
structure antitrust litigation so as to avoid, on 
the one hand, the use of antitrust theories too 
abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on 
the other, consideration of every possible fact or 
theory irrespective of the minimal light it may 
shed on the basic question—that of the presence 
of significant unjustified anticompetitive 
consequences.  
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238. In addition, nothing in this 
opinion precludes a defendant from prevailing on a motion to 
dismiss or motion for summary judgment if, for example, 
there is no dispute that, under the rule of reason, the 
procompetitive benefits of a reverse payment outweigh the 
payment’s alleged anticompetitive harm.  
